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Imagine yourself the State's attorney involved in highly sensitive
preliminary negotiations to settle a class action lawsuit involving a
politically charged topic such as school desegregation or prison reform.
In the course of negotiations, the presiding judge informs you that the
State may not only have waived sovereign immunity by the very act of
exploring settlement but that, regardless of whether the court actually
approves the settlement, the State might further be bound by conces-
sions it provisionally agreed to make as a condition of settlement. Such
a situation, unthinkable in a private class action, may actually arise
under current Arkansas law, which appears to provide that officers of
the executive branch, whether wittingly or not, can waive the State's
sovereign immunity by their conduct and can commit the State to
various positions simply by provisionally subscribing to them in the
course of settlement negotiations.
The ensuing discussion addresses the Arkansas Supreme Court's
theoretically disturbing and often self-contradictory pronouncements
on the issue of the State's sovereign immunity. Part II considers the
constitutional framework upon which the doctrine of sovereign
immunity rests, concluding that the supreme court over time has
developed a concept of waiver that conflicts with the literal text of the
constitution and effects a qualified transfer of legislative decision-
making power to the judiciary. Part III suggests that in the recent case
of Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee,' the court may have
extended the concept of waiver even further, ruling for the first time
that the State might waive its immunity not only by the legislature's
delegating its decision-making powers to the courts, but also by the
executive's conduct in conditionally attempting to compromise claims
against the State. This section further suggests that as d corollary to this
novel concept of waiver, the court in Lake View verged on adopting an
extraordinary new rule of evidence-that if the State seeks to settle a
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University of California at Berkeley; J.D. Boalt Hall, University of California at
Berkeley; Assistant Attorney General of Arkansas, Opinions Division. The opinions
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putative class action, it will not only waive its immunity but also be
bound by its representations in the proposed class settlement even if the
settlement is never approved. Finally, Part IV suggests that the
confusing case law regarding the scope of sovereign immunity merely
complicates a problem that should properly be addressed by way of
constitutional amendment.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASES FOR SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE
COURT'S INCONSISTENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. Sovereign Immunity and the Obligation to Pay the State's Just
Debts
The doctrine of state court sovereign immunity is set forth in the
Arkansas Constitution, article V, section 20, which provides: "The
State of Arkansas shall never be made defendant in any of her courts.",
2
This provision must be read in conjunction with Arkansas Constitution
article XVI, section 2, which provides that the legislature shall arrange
for payment of all "just and legal debts" incurred by the State.3 In
Fireman's Insurance Co. v. Arkansas State Claims Commission,4 the
supreme court considered the interplay of these two constitutional
provisions. The court approvingly invoked a "long and unequivocal
line of cases" establishing that "the constitutional prohibition [of suits
against the State] was not merely declaratory that the State could not
be sued without her consent, but that all suits against the State were
expressly forbidden."5
By statute, the General Assembly has delegated to the Arkansas
State. Claims Commission ("Claims Commission") its constitutional
duty to pay all the State's just debts.6 In Fireman 's, the court expressly
2. ARK. CONST. art. V, § 20. Unless otherwise noted, all constitutional provisions
mentioned or cited in this article refer to provisions of the Arkansas Constitution.
3. ARK. CONST. art. XVI, § 2. This provision might be read as complementing
Arkansas Constitution article 1I, section 13, which provides generally that "[e]very
person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws." However, in Hardin v. City of DeValls
Bluff, 256 Ark. 480, 485, 508 S.W.2d 559, 563 (1974), the supreme court held that the
constitution does not require affording claimants "redress for asserted wrongs against
counties and cities acting in their governmental capacities." By extension, it appears
that article II, section 13 could not independently be read as obligating the State to
provide a forum to entertain claims against it.
4. 301 Ark. 451,784 S.W.2d 771 (1990).
5. Id. at 455, 784 S.W.2d at 773.
6. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-10-204(a) (LEXIS Supp. 2001). Subject to certain
inapplicable exceptions, the Claims Commission has "exclusive jurisdiction over all
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pronounced this post-deprivation procedure consistent with due
process.7 The court further stated:
[T]he Claims Commission is an arm of the General Assembly and
the General Assembly has total control over the determination of,
and subsequent funding for, payment of the "just debts and obliga-
tions of the state"--all other avenues of redress through legal
proceedings being barred by the sovereign immunity provision of the
Arkansas Constitution... .8
In Hanley v. Arkansas State Claims Commission,9 the court empha-
sized the terms "total control" in referring to the General Assembly's
power over payment of debts and "all other avenues of redress" in
quoting the recited passage from Fireman's, thus suggesting a continued
policy of avoiding any waiver of sovereign immunity.'0 The court noted
that the Claims Commission was established in 1949 precisely because
sovereign immunity barred judicial resolution of claims against the
State and that "all appeals of the Commission's rulings must be heard
by the General Assembly, and not the courts."
'"
B. Waiving Sovereign Immunity: Separation of Powers Implications
Despite the foregoing, the court in Fireman's acknowledged at least
one instance in which the State might be made a defendant in her own
courts:
The only exception to total and complete sovereign immunity from
claims which has been recognized by this court occurs when the
state is the moving party seeking specific relief. In that instance the
state is prohibited from raising the defense of sovereign immunity
as a defense to a counterclaim or offset. 2
Notwithstanding the court's claim that this passage recited the "only
exception to total and complete sovereign immunity,"'13 the State in fact
waives its immunity under other circumstances, albeit usually under
claims against the State of Arkansas and its several agencies, departments, and
institutions." Id. (emphasis added).
7. Fireman's, 301 Ark. at 457, 784 S.W.2d at 775.
8. Id. at 458, 784 S.W.2d at 775.
9. 333 Ark. 159, 970 S.W.2d 198 (1998).
10. Id. at 166, 970 S.W.2d at 201.
11. Id., 970 S.W.2d at 201.
12. 301 Ark. 455, 784 S.W.2d 774 (citing Parker v. Moore, 222 Ark. 811, 262
S.W.2d 891 (1953)).
13. Id., 784 S.W.2d at 774.
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compulsion. As the court noted in Solomon v. Valco, Inc., 4 "[e]xceptions
to the rule prohibiting suits against the state are few."" For instance,
the State now submits to illegal-exaction suits filed pursuant to
Arkansas Constitution article XVI, section 13, which expressly
authorizes such suits by citizens, only because the supreme court has
declared that this provision takes priority over Arkansas Constitution
article V, section 20, which dictates that the State not appear as a
defendant in her own courts. 6 Similarly, the State occasionally accedes
to suit in federal court as a condition of receiving crucial federal grant
money. 7 On occasion, the State has allowed itself to be sued in other
circumstances.18 Even when the State allows suit, as when the Highway
Department condemns property without first making provisions for
compensation, the supreme court frequently seeks to characterize the
consent to suit as something other than a waiver of sovereign immu-
nity.' 9  Hence, the court in Solomon simply declared that
"[c]ondemnation cases are . . . not considered claims against the
state. '20 The State is further deemed not to have waived its sovereign
immunity when it is statutorily obligated to appear, as in dependency-
neglect proceedings.2'
Because article XVI, section 2 charges the General Assembly with
paying the State's debts, any such waiver of immunity or consent to
suit implicates the separation of powers doctrine established in
Arkansas Constitution article IV, section 2, which requires that the
three branches of government-legislative, executive, and judi-
14. 288 Ark. 106, 702 S.W.2d 6 (1986).
15. Id. at 107, 702 S.W.2d at 7.
16. See Massongill v. County of Scott, 337 Ark. 281, 285, 991 S.W.2d 105, 108
(1999). "We have in the past recognized the evident tension between the State's
sovereign immunity and the constitutional right of the people to contest an illegal
exaction. We resolved that conflict in favor of the people's ability to recover funds
wrongfully expended." Id., 991 S.W.2d at 108 (citations omitted).
17. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 697 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting the coercive force of tying
highway and education grants to waiver of immunity); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v.
Mauney, 183 F.3d 816, 819-20 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding that receipt of grants under
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act constituted waiver of sovereign immunity).
18. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-18-406 (LEXIS Supp. 2001) (authorizing
judicial review of a final deficiency determination made by the Department of Finance
and Administration); First Nat'l Bank v. Ark. Dev. Fin. Auth., 44 Ark. App. 143, 870
S.W.2d 400 (1994) (defending suit against state agency).
19. See Ark. State Highway Comm'n v. Flake, 254 Ark. 624, 625, 495 S.W.2d 855,
856 (1973).
20. Solomon, 288 Ark. at 108, 702 S.W.2d at 7.
21. Ark. Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338, 348, 954
S.W.2d 907, 912 (1997).
[Vol. 24
STATE COURT SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
cial-remain separate and distinct and that such separation be strictly
enforced.2 In Fireman's, the only Arkansas case squarely to address the
issue, the supreme court declared that the legislature had "without
question delegated to the Commission duties which are, under the
Constitution, solely the duties of the General Assembly. '23  This
delegation would appear to be constitutionally unimpeachable precisely
because the Commission is "an arm of the General Assembly.,
24
However, the courts comprise a separate branch of government, and
any delegation to them of the duty to determine whether a debt exists
would appear to constitute an unlawful delegation of powers in
violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
Any such waiver would admittedly amount to only a partial
delegation of legislative powers-the power to determine the existence
of the State's debts, with the discretion actually to pay such debts
presumably remaining in the legislature. However, this discretion is
sharply limited by the directive in article XVI, section 2 that the
legislature indeed pay the State's "just and legal debts.,,25 Given this
constitutional directive, merely determining that a debt exists would
trigger an absolute obligation to discharge it. Transferring to the courts
the duty to determine the State's debts is thus a very real transfer of
power from one branch to the other. The legislature would conse-
quently appear to be constitutionally precluded from waiving sovereign
immunity-not by operation of article V, section 20,26 which the
Arkansas Supreme Court has broadly read as permitting legislative
waiver 7-but rather by operation of article XVI, section 228 and article
IV, section 2,29 which mandate that the legislature alone determine and
pay the State's debts.3"
22. See generally Oates v. Rogers, 201 Ark. 335, 347, 144 S.W.2d 457, 463 (1940).
Under the classic division of powers, the legislature makes the laws and appropriates
state revenues, the executive administers the law and expends the appropriations, and
the judiciary interprets the law. See Chaffin v. Ark. Game & Fish Comm'n, 296 Ark.
431, 757 S.W.2d 950 (1988); Fed. Express Corp. v. Skelton, 265 Ark. 187, 578 S.W.2d
1 (1979); Hooker v. Parkin, 235 Ark. 218, 357 S.W.2d 534 (1962).
23. Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Ark. State Claims Comm'n, 301 Ark. 451, 458, 784
S.W.2d 771, 775 (1990).
24. Id., 784 S.W.2d at 775.
25. ARK. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
26. See supra text accompanying note 2.
27. See Ark. Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Mitchell, 330 Ark. 338, 346,
954 S.W.2d at 907, 911 (1997).
28. See supra text accompanying note 25.
29. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
30. Professor L. Scott Stafford offers a different analysis of this issue. See Scott
Stafford, Separation ofPowers andArkansas AdministrativeAgencies: Distinguishing Judicial
2002]
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Despite the established fact of waiver under specified circum-
stances, as noted in Fireman 's,31 the court has frequently declared that
article V, section 20 flatly prohibits the State from consenting to be
sued in its own courts.32 The Arkansas Supreme Court has more
recently echoed this principle in Grine v. Board of Trustees,33 noting that
sovereign immunity "arises from express constitutional declaration"
and that consent to suit is consequently "expressly withheld by the
Constitution of this State. 34 However, shortly after having suggested
that invoking sovereign immunity is not a matter of discretion, the
court in Grine allowed that the State can indeed waive its sovereign
immunity: "[S]overeign immunity is jurisdictional immunity from suit,
and where the pleadings show the action is one against the State, the
Power and Legislative Power, 7 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 279 (1984). Stafford suggests
that "separation of powers requires that the legislature retain the ultimate authority to
appropriate public funds for the payment of the 'just and legal debts' of the state," thus
rendering any judicial determination of those debts objectionable as being purely
advisory. Id. at 291. He then suggests that this problem could be resolved if the
legislature "appropriate[d] in advance the funds from which to pay any claims
determined by the courts and thereby ensure that the courts would be able to enforce
their determinations." Id. However, if the legislature vested in the courts the power to
determine debt, that determination would be far from advisory since the legislature
would be constitutionally obligated to pay the debt. Moreover, it is unclear how
Professor Stafford's proposed solution, which would give the courts final decision-
making power, avoids the separation of powers problem. Id. at 353. I do agree with
Professor Stafford that if the transfer of power were deemed illusory because payment
remains wholly contingent on legislative consent, the very fact of that contingency
would preclude trial courts from hearing such claims. In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Olive's
Sporting Goods, Inc., the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that determining the amount
of an unlitigated, contingent claim is "not appropriate for declaratory judgment" and
that any such determination "would be tantamount to issuing an advisory opinion,
something courts are prohibited from doing." 25 Ark. App. 81, 83-84, 753 S.W.2d 284,
286 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 297 Ark. 516, 764 S.W.2d 596; see also Waldrip v.
Davis, 40 Ark. App. 25, 27, 842 S.W.2d 49, 49 (1992); Kunz v. Jamigan, 25 Ark. App.
221, 227, 756 S.W.2d 913, 917 (1988) (acknowledging that trial courts are forbidden
to render advisory opinions). Although claims heard and resolved by the courts will
obviously have been litigated, the claims will nevertheless remain contingent on
legislative approval for payment. A ruling that in effect declares "I think you should pay
this if you Want to" has a decidedly advisory ring.
31. 301 Ark. 451,455, 784 S.W.2d771,774(1990).
32. See, e.g., Fairbanks v. Sheffield, 226 Ark. 703, 706, 292 S.W.2d 82, 84 (1956)
(declaring that sovereign immunity is a constitutional mandate that "cannot be waived
by the General Assembly"); Ark. State Highway Comm'n v. Nelson Bros., 191 Ark.
629, 634, 87 S.W.2d 394, 396 (1935).
33. 338 Ark. 791,796, 2 S.W.3d 54, 58 (1999).
34. Id., 2 S.W.3d at 58 (quoting Pitcock v. State, 91 Ark. 527, 535, 121 S.W. 742,
745 (1909)).
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trial court acquires no jurisdiction. However, unlike subject-matter
jurisdiction, sovereign immunity can be waived.
35
In its most recent pronouncement on the subject, the Arkansas
Supreme Court declared:
Ark. Const. art. 5, § 20, grants sovereign immunity and a general
prohibition against awards of money damages in lawsuits against the
State of Arkansas and its institutions. The doctrine of sovereign
immunity is rigid, and, as such, the immunity may be waived only
in limited circumstances. Thus, where the suit is one against the
State and there has been no waiver of immunity, the trial court
acquires no jurisdiction.36
As illustrated in Fireman's, one variety of waiver occurs automati-
cally when the State decides to seek relief in the courts; in that
instance, the State is deemed to have consented to have the courts
resolve any claim of offset or counterclaim. Moreover, notwithstanding
the court's declaration to the contrary in Fairbanks v. Sheffield,37 the
courts have established that the legislature can waive the State's
sovereign immunity. As the court noted in Arkansas Office of Child
Support Enforcement v. Mitchell:
We have held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is rigid and,
as such, immunity may be waived only in limited circumstances.
Under the doctrine, the State possesses jurisdictional immunity from
suit. Where the suit is one against the State and there has been no
waiver of immunity, the trial court acquires no jurisdiction. We have
recognized exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity when
an act of the legislature has created a specific waiver of immunity,
and when the State is the moving party seeking specific relief.38
As the foregoing discussion should suggest, the two exceptions to
sovereign immunity recited in Mitchell raise separation of powers
concerns that the supreme court has in the past chosen to ignore.
Perhaps in the interests of fairness or judicial economy, the court has
simply declared that the State exposes itself to suit when the State itself
35. Id. at 796-97, 2 S.W.3d at 58 (citing Brown v. Ark. State HVACR Licensing
Bd., 336 Ark. 34, 984 S.W.2d 402 (1999)).
36. Aka v. Jefferson Co. Hosp. Ass'n, 344 Ark. 627, 644, 42 S.W.3d 508, 520
(2001).
37. 226 Ark. at 706, 292 S.W.2d at 84.
38. 330 Ark. at 345-46, 954 S.W.2d at 911 (citations omitted); accord Ark. Pub.
Defender Comm'n v. Burnett, 340 Ark. 233, 237, 12 S.W.3d 191, 193 (2000). As noted
above, Fireman 's recites only the latter of these bases for suit against the State. See supra
text accompanying note 12.
2002]
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elects to sue. The court has left unaddressed the question of whether
this principle runs afoul of the constitutional imperatives that the State
cannot be sued and that only the legislature can determine the State's
just debts. The court has been similarly reticent regarding the constitu-
tional question of why the General Assembly should be permitted to
delegate to the judiciary the legislative task of entertaining claims
against the State. As discussed in the next section, the court has
recently compounded this apparent constitutional difficulty by
suggesting that not only the General Assembly through legislation but
also the executive branch through conduct might waive the State's
sovereign immunity.
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE LAKE VIEW DECISION
A. Waiver by Conduct
In Lake View School District No. 25 v. Huckabee,39 the supreme court
addressed a trial court's disposition of a widely publicized class action
that challenged the State's system of school financing as unconstitu-
tional because of the disparity in available funds for the State's school
districts. After much maneuvering, the parties negotiated a proposed
settlement and circulated an agreed settlement order that included
various stipulations, including the following: Lake View school
district's efforts led to an increase in school funding totaling approxi-
mately $130 million; Lake View should be awarded its attorneys' fees;
and Lake View should be precluded from challenging as unconstitu-
tional various legislation enacted in 1995 and 1997 designed to address
what the court in 1994 had determined to be inadequacies in the school
financing formula.4°
In accordance with the prescribed procedures for handling class
actions,4' the chancery court approved notice of the proposed settlement
to putative class members and scheduled a fairness hearing on the
proposed agreed order.42 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)
objected to the agreed order, in part because it precluded any further
constitutional challenge to the 1995 and 1997 legislation.43 In the
course of several hearings conducted in March and April of 1998, the
39. 340 Ark. 481, 10 S.W.3d 892 (2000).
40. Id. at 489, 10 S.W.3d at 897.
41. See ARK. R. Civ. P. 23.
42. Lake View, 340 Ark. at 489, 10 S.W.3d at 85.
43. Id. at 489-90, 10 S.W.3d at 897.
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court concluded that the ACLU had standing to raise its objections,
expressed "great concern" over the settlement provision purporting to
foreclose future litigation, and declined to approve the agreed order.'
Following the court's rejection of the agreed order, counsel for the
State nevertheless announced that the State stood by its contents.45
Lake View then moved for a determination of its attorneys' fees
and a final adjudication of the merits. 46 Although the State now
opposed an award of fees, counsel for the State continued to "[affirm]
the Agreed Order recitation that a $130 million fund was created by
Lake View's efforts." '47 In considering the State's opposition to an
award of attorneys' fees, the trial court referred to an "immunity
argument" the State had raised.48 The court further approved a notice
to class members that Lake View's counsel would be awarded $7
million and that the case would be dismissed.49 On June 8, 1998, the
State submitted by brief its argument that sovereign immunity barred
an award of attorneys' fees.50 The court subsequently conducted a
hearing on these issues and entered its final order on August 17, 1998."
The court concluded that Lake View's fourth amended complaint was
rendered moot by Arkansas Constitution amendment 74, which
authorizes funding variances among school districts based upon local
taxes. 2 The court further noted that the 1995 and 1997 legislation was
presumptively constitutional and had not been challenged as without
a rational basis in Lake View's pleadings. 3 The court declined either
to award attorneys' fees, in part because it held that sovereign
immunity barred recovery from the State, or to address Lake View's
waiver-of-sovereign-immunity argument, which it concluded had not
been raised in a timely fashion.
54
On appeal, the supreme court disagreed that either Amendment 74
or the 1995 and 1997 legislation mooted Lake View's complaint,
instead holding that Lake View must be permitted to present its case
that these constitutional and legislative provisions failed to correct the
44. Id. at 490, 10 S.W.3d at 897.
45. Id., 10 S.W.3d at 898.
46. Id. at 491, 10 S.W.3d at 898.
47. Id., 10 S.W.3d at 898.
48. Lake View, 340 Ark. at 491, 10 S.W.3d at 898.
49. Id., 10 S.W.3d at 898.
50. Id., 10 S.W.3d at 898.
51. Id. at492, 10 S.W.3d at 898.
52. Id., 10 S.W.3d at 898.
53. Id., 10 S.W.3d at 899.
54. Lake View, 340 Ark. at 492-93, 10 S.W.3d at 899.
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disparities among school districts identified in the 1994 order.5 With
respect to the stipulations contained in the rejected agreed order, the
court remarked:
There is no doubt that Lake View agreed to dismiss the case and
forego -future litigation if its attorneys' fees and costs were paid. But
the chancery court refused to sign the order because it barred future
contests on the unconstitutionality of the school funding system. The
court also refused to approve attorneys' fees of $7 million, following
Lake View's agreement that the case was moot. At that point, the
agreement among the parties had fallen through, and the parties were
back to square one on the compliance issue. Under these circum-
stances, Lake View was entitled to move on with its cause of action
and press for a compliance trial.56
The court further ruled that the trial court had erred in refusing to
award Lake View its attorneys' fees.57 The court held that "there is no
question but that a substantial economic benefit has accrued not only
to the poorer school districts as a direct result of Lake View's efforts
but to the state as a whole. 5 8 In partial support of this conclusion, the
court offered the following:
The chancery court acknowledged that through Lake View's efforts,
the State was getting a fair school funding formula. And Tim
Humphries of the Attorney General's Office told the chancery court
that the State of Arkansas stood by the language in the Agreed Order
even after the court refused to sign it. Also, at the April 6, 1998
hearing, James M. Llewellyn, Jr., on behalf of the State advised the
chancery court that "at least One Hundred Million and probably
more" was created by the effects of Amendment 74 alone and that
"all of us still stand on the Agreed Order recitation that there was [a]
One Hundred and Thirty Million Dollar fund created." Mr.
Llewellyn further advised the chancery court that the court should
reconsider the Agreed Order because "we all believe that you're the
proper person to say what is a reasonable attorneys' fee."'59
The supreme court also rejected the trial court's conclusion that the
State had failed to raise the issue of sovereign immunity in a timely
fashion. 6' The court concluded that the issue of sovereign immunity
55. Id. at 493-94, 10 S.W.3d at 900.
56. Id. at 494, 10 S.W.3d at 900.
57. Id. at 495-97, 10 S.W.3d at 900.
58. Id. at 495, 10 S.W.3d at 900.
59. Id. at 495-96, 10 S.W.3d at 901.
60. Lake View, 340 Ark. at 497, 10 S.W.3d at 901.
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was clearly implicated insofar as state revenues would be tapped to pay
the attorneys' fees.6 However, in a totally unprecedented mode of
analysis, the court felt obliged to consider whether the State's conduct
in the course of the litigation may have amounted to a waiver of
sovereign immunity. Specifically, the court observed:
It is axiomatic that the State of Arkansas can voluntarily waive a
sovereign-immunity defense. In addition, the State can consent to
being sued. We conclude that when the State of Arkansas signed off
in two published notices to the class members advocating that
attorneys' fees be paid and continued to push for payment of
attorneys' fees even after the chancery court refused to sign the
Agreed Order, it waived its sovereign-immunity defense to payment
of those fees. We do understand that the State was seeking resolution
of this litigation by supporting payment of those fees, but we are
hard pressed to reconcile published notices to class members
supporting fees and representations to the chancery court to the same
effect with a later claim of immunity.62
The supreme court in Lake View thus ruled that the State can waive
sovereign immunity and accede to suit solely by conduct suggesting
some state liability in a particular lawsuit, even though it has not sought
any affirmative relief in the lawsuit and the legislature has not
expressly waived immunity. This novel proposition is unsupported by
any of the cases cited by the court in the passage just quoted.63
The suggestion in Lake View that an arguable entry of appearance
can nullify a constitutional proscription against suit is itself inconsistent
with the court's pronouncement only a month and four days earlier in
Arkansas Public Defender Commission v. Burnett,64 where the court stated:
"Unless sovereign immunity is waived, the doctrine prohibits imposing
liability upon the State. We have recognized two exceptions to the doctrine
61. Id. at 496, 10 S.W.3d at 901.
62. Id. at 496-97, 10 S.W.3d at 901 (citations omitted). See infra note 63 for a
discussion of the cases cited by the court in the quoted passage.
63. Although the court in Newton v. Etoch acknowledged that sovereign immunity
can be waived, it failed even to mention how such a waiver might be effected. 332 Ark.
325, 331, 965 S.W.2d 96, 99 (1998). The court in State v. Mitchell expressly declared
that a waiver can be effected only by legislative action or by the State's affirmatively
seeking relief in the courts. 330 Ark. 338, 345-47, 954 S.W.2d 907, 910-12 (1997). The
court in State v. Tedder merely acknowledged in passing that the General Assembly can
waive sovereign immunity through legislation. 326 Ark. 495, 496 932 S.W.2d 755, 756
(1996). Finally, Ozarks Unlimited Resources Cooperative v. Daniels merely acknowledged
without elaboration that the government might waive immunity or consent to suit. 333
Ark. 214, 221, 969 S.W.2d 169, 172 (1998).
64. 340 Ark. 233, 12 S.W.3d 191 (2000).
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ofsovereign immunity: (1) where the State is the moving party seeking specific
relief; and (2) where an act of the legislature has created a specific waiver of
immunity.
65
Nothing in this formulation suggests that the State can waive
sovereign immunity by conduct amounting to constructive consent.66
However, to add to the confusion, immediately after reciting the
standard just quoted, the court in Burnett remarked that the State had
not "entered its appearance" in the action at issue, suggesting that
waiver can also be effected by responsive pleading.67
The suggestion that the State's efforts to settle a claim might
amount to constructive consent to suit was raised most recently in
Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes, and Lerach v. State,68 which arose from a
claim for attorneys' fees purportedly incurred in the class action
tobacco litigation. In Milberg, the State settled its claims by consent
decree against the defendant tobacco companies.69  The appellant-
attorneys, who claimed to have represented the class plaintiffs on
65. Id. at 237, 12 S.W.3d at 193 (emphasis added).
66. With respect to actions in federal court, the United States Supreme Court has
clearly expressed its hostility to the notion of inferring that a state has constructively
consented to suit. In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board, the Court approvingly recalled a previous ruling:
[W]e observed (in dictum) that there is "no place" for the doctrine of
constructive waiver in our sovereign-immunity jurisprudence, and we
emphasized that we would "find waiver only where stated by the most
express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as
[will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction."
527 U.S. 666, 678 (1999) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)). The
Court then overruled Parden v. Terminal Railway of the Alabama State Docks Department,
377 U.S. 184 (1964), which held that a state constructively consents to suit under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act by operating a railroad in interstate commerce. The
Court observed: "We think that the constructive-waiver experiment of Parden was ill
conceived, and see no merit in attempting to salvage any remnant of it." Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. at 680. The Court based its ruling on the following familiar general
formulation regarding waiver:
The classic description of an effective waiver of a constitutional right is the
"intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege."
"[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of
fundamental constitutional rights. State sovereign immunity, no less than the
right to trial by jury in criminal cases, is constitutionally protected. And in
the context of federal sovereign immunity--obviously the closest analogy to
the present case-it is well established that waivers are not implied.
Id. at 682 (citations omitted). Given the equally impeccable constitutional pedigree of
state sovereign immunity, this reasoning would appear to apply to the issue of waiver
and consent in state court as well.
67. Burnett, 340 Ark. at 237, 12 S.W.3d at 194.
68. 342 Ark. 303, 28 S.W.3d 842 (2000).
69. Id. at 309. 28 S.W.3d at 846.
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behalf of the State, argued that the chancellor had erred in ruling that
the State had not waived its sovereign immunity defense against the
appellants' claims for attorneys' fees.7" The supreme court affirmed the
chancellor's decision on this point.7
The court's reasoning in reaching its conclusion bears some
analysis. The court began by offering the following familiar formula-
tion regarding sovereign immunity:
Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional immunity from suit. This
defense arises from Article 5, § 20, of the Arkansas Constitution,
which provides: "The State of Arkansas shall never be made a
defendant in any of her courts." This court has consistently inter-
preted this constitutional provision as a general prohibition against
awards of money damages in lawsuits against the state and its
institutions. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is rigid and may
only be waived in limited circumstances. This court has recognized
only two ways in which a claim of sovereign immunity may be
surmounted: (1) where the state is the moving party seeking specific
relief; and (2) where an act of the legislature has created a specific
waiver of immunity.
7 2
The court then offered several reasons why the State had not waived
sovereign immunity against the attorneys' claims for fees in the
tobacco litigation. First, it noted that the appellants had never been
given leave to intervene in the underlying chancery court action and
that their claim consequently could not be characterized as a "counter-
claim or offset" of the sort -that might defeat sovereign immunity.7
Second, the court rejected the argument that the State had waived its
immunity by moving to amend the consent decree to include appellants
on a negotiated list of outside counsel to be paid by the tobacco
litigants.74
The State's motion might arguably have been characterized as
directly related to the terms of the settlement and hence part of the
settlement negotiation process. In support of their argument, the
appellants invoked Lake View, in which the court had ruled that the
State waived sovereign immunity in part by conditionally agreeing in
the course of settlement negotiations that it would pay plaintiffs'
70. Id. at 320, 28 S.W.3d at 853-54.
71. Id. at 323, 28 S.W.3d at 856.
72. Id. at 320-21, 28 S.W.3d at 854 (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 321, 28 S.W.3d at 854.
74. Milberg, 342 Ark. at 323, 28 S.W.3d at 855.
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attorneys' fees if the proposed settlement were approved. The court
distinguished Lake View as follows:
The state's actions in Lake View are distinguishable, in that, there, the
state not only advocated the payment of attorney's fees in general,
it advocated that the fees be paid from state funds. Here, however,
the State advocated only that Appellants be paid attorney's fees from
the tobacco companies. . . . Additionally, unlike the situation in Lake
View, the State did not continue to push for attorney's fees on behalf
of Appellants. To the contrary, the State withdrew its motion before
any action had been taken by the chancery court. It is thus clear that
the State never waived its immunity from a claim for attorney's fees
to be collected from State coffers. Accordingly, our decision in Lake
View does not require a reversal of the chancellor's finding that the
State was entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity.75
The court concluded that the appellants were limited to seeking
recovery of fees directly from the State before the Claims
Commission.
7 6
With respect to the question of waiver, what is perhaps most
striking about Milberg is that in the very act of reasserting that the State
can waive sovereign immunity only by legislative action or by itself
seeking specific judicial relief, the court acknowledged that the State
might waive its immunity by a third route-by conditionally admitting
state liability in the course of settlement negotiations. Although the
court went on to conclude that no such waiver had occurred in the case
before it, the court's decision is fully consistent with the conclusion in
Lake View that the State can waive its immunity merely by attempting
to settle a dispute. Both cases thus suggest that executive conduct can
locate in the judiciary a decision-making power that the constitution
locates exclusively in the legislative branch of government.
B. The Evidentiary Implications of Lake View
The court's pronouncements in Lake View and Milberg raise certain
disturbing evidentiary as well as jurisdictional questions. Subsection (e)
of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23 provides that any
compromise of a class action must be approved by the court after class
members have been provided notice of the proposed settlement and an
75. Id. at 323, 28 S.W.3d at 855.
76. Id. at 324, 28 S.W.3d at 856.
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opportunity to object.77 Rule 408 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence
provides that evidence of offering or accepting certain consideration in
compromising a disputed claim is not admissible to prove either
liability on or the amount of :a claim. 7' Rule 408 exists to promote
complete candor among litigants and thereby to encourage
settlements. 79 The effect of Rule 408 is to keep the finder of fact's
judgment from being influenced by a litigant's acknowledgment during
settlement negotiations of potential exposure. However, the rule's
purpose can be frustrated in a class action because filing and sending
notice of a proposed agreed order of settlement necessarily publicizes
settlement terms that the court may reject based on the response to the
notice or on its own motion. In such a situation, the court is left to
resolve factual disputes knowing what resolution the parties deem fair.
The rejected order might even stipulate as to certain facts upon which
the parties agreed solely to effect a settlement. Such a result clearly
violates the spirit of Rule 408.
The scenario just recited may have been played out in Lake View.
As previously noted, the parties negotiated and circulated an agreed
order that included a provision for attorneys' fees, but the chancery
court eventually rejected the proposed settlement.80 Assuming these
were the only relevant facts, the appropriate course under Rule 408
would appear to have been for the court to treat everything in the
agreed order as a nullity, including any waiver of sovereign immunity
and any stipulation regarding the value of any common benefit the
plaintiffs may have bestowed on the State by pursuing their action.
However, the court in Lake View made no such effort to rebag the cat,
instead ruling that a waiver of sovereign immunity for the limited
purpose of negotiating a settlement would survive the breakdown of the
settlement process.81 Moreover, the court declared in Milberg that the
plaintiffs' pursuit of Lake View had created a common benefit fund of
$130 millions 2-a statement supported by its inclusion as a stipulation
77. ARK. R. Ctv. P. 23(e).
78. ARK. R. EvID. 408; cf ARK. R. CRIM. P. 25.4 (providing that, with certain limited
exceptions, neither the fact nor the substance of criminal plea negotiations will be
admissible in any criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding).
79. See Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Ark. Sheriff's Boys' Ranch, 280 Ark. 53, 64, 655
S.W.2d 389, 395 (1983).
80. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 340 Ark. 481, 489-90, 10 S.W.3d
892, 896-97 (2000).
81. Id.at496, 10S.W.3dat901.
82. See Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes, & Lerach v. State, 342 Ark. 303, 321, 28
S.W.3d 842, 854-55 (2000).
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in the rejected agreed order.83 These events might be read as supporting
the proposition that the State will be bound by anything contained in a
proposed class action settlement agreement regardless of whether the
settlement is approved. In short, it appears that Rule 23 may trump
Rule 408, at least when the government is the class action defendant.
However, the court might not accept such a neat summary of its
ruling. Significantly, the court appears to have been struck by the
particular strength and breadth of state support for the agreed order,
noting that the full legislative council and the governor had advocated
its approval.84 Moreover, the court ruled that the State had waived
sovereign immunity not only because it had advocated the payment of
attorneys' fees in the notice to class members-an event that occurred
before the court rejected the proposed agreed order-but also because
it had "continued to push" for payment of fees even after the
rejection. 5 In its recitation of the facts, the court further stressed that
the State had announced, even after the rejection, that it stood generally
by the agreed order and specifically by the recitation therein that Lake
View's efforts had created a $130 million fund.86 Given the court's
focus on these post-rejection ratifications of the agreed order, it is
unclear that it would consider anything contained in the proposed order
an admission in itself.87 Nevertheless, the court's focus in the recited
paragraph on the substance of the class notice remains significant. It
may be that the court is inclined to treat as an admission anything that
has already been publicized in accordance with the procedural
83. Lake View, 340 Ark. at 489, 10 S.W.3d at 897.
84. Id. at490, 10 S.W.3d at 897.
85. Id.at496, 10S.W.3dat901.
86. Id. at490-91, 10 S.W.3d at 898.
87. For purposes of comparison, one might consider the approach currently applied
to obligatory determinations of just compensation made by the Arkansas State Highway
Commission in condemnation proceedings. As the court declared in Arkansas State
Highway Commission v. Johnson:
We conclude that when the commission is required by federal or state law to
reach a determination of just compensation and to communicate that
information to the landowner, the court, or third parties, it is by statutory
definition more than an offer or compromise figure. While it is true that a
jury or court may award more or less than the amount stated, that does not
change the fact that such a statement constitutes an admission of the
constitutional entitlement of the condemnee, and it should be admissible as
evidence to rebut the condemnor's contentions that the condemned property
is worth less than the amount stated as just compensation.
300 Ark. 454, 463, 780 S.W.2d 326, 331 (1989). I do not believe that a term in a
proposed class action settlement should be treated as the evidentiary equivalent of "an
admission of... constitutional entitlement." Id.
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requirements for maintaining a class action. Perhaps the court simply
feels it would be unseemly for the State to repudiate a position it has
publicly endorsed-a factor that may likewise have influenced the
court in the Johnson ruling.88
The court's ruling in Lake View may have limited application
beyond this single, unusual, and high-profile class action; indeed, at the
conclusion of its opinion, the court itself felt compelled to emphasize
"that this is a unique case with a unique set of circumstances. ' 89 It may
be that Lake View will consequently be largely ignored in the future as
sui generis-i.e., as a case in which a unique set of circumstances
prompted a somewhat result-oriented decision. It seems doubtful that
the court would extend its ruling to cover the substance of settlement
negotiations in any other type of civil or criminal litigation. Rule 408
has a long and noble history, which the court may have tacitly ignored
in this instance both because Rule 23 dictated public disclosure and
because the State proved disturbingly eager to ratify representations
initially offered only on condition of settlement. The court's holding in
Lake View consequently appears limited in its application.
If one were to adopt the most draconian possible interpretation of
Lake View, concluding that it rendered admissible against the State the
substance of any settlement negotiations, be the case civil or criminal,
the General Assembly might be inclined effectively to overrule the
88. See supra note 87.
89. Lake View, 340 Ark. at 497, 10 S.W.3d at 902. Among these circumstances
might be what seems the court's distaste that the State advocated a proposed settlement
that both the trial court and, in retrospect, the supreme court itself felt would have ill
served the class members' interests. The court further seemed nettled that the State
appeared to ratify the substance of this proposed settlement even after the trial court had
rejected it, only to withdraw that ratification later. The court's point may simply be that
the State should not be permitted publicly and voluntarily to concede and then later to
deny that a case had resulted in a substantial benefit to Arkansans. The court has more
recently found occasion to comment on the relative effects of a defendant's conceding
or disputing a substantial benefit:
Nor do we see recovery as appropriate under a substantial-benefit theory
such as we approved in Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee. In Lake View,
the State waived sovereign immunity, acknowledged that a substantial
benefit in a fixed dollar amount had accrued to the State due to the attorneys'
efforts, and urged the court to approve the attorney's fees. Here, the
nonpaying corporations have acknowledged no benefit that resulted from the
Attorneys' efforts and have never recognized the attorney's entitlement to
attorney's fees. The two situations are entirely different.
Fox v. AAA U-Rent It, 341 Ark. 483, 491, 17 S.W.3d 481, 486 (2000). This passage
suggests that the court might limit applying its new category of waiver by admission to
the singular instance in which the State has conceded a public benefit that triggers a
public obligation to pay attorneys' fees.
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court by legislatively declaring the confidentiality of such information.
Any effort to do so would appear to raise separation of powers
concerns. The supreme court has stated that in case of a conflict
between a legislative enactment and a court rule, the court "will defer
to the General Assembly, when conflicts arise, only to the extent that
the conflicting court rule's primary purpose and effectiveness are not
compromised; otherwise, our rules remain supreme." 90 However, as the
court acknowledged in Price v. Price,9' this rule does not always apply:
"An exception to the foregoing rule exists when the statutory rule is
based upon a fixed public policy which has been legislatively or
constitutionally adopted and has as its basis something other than court
administration. "92
The Sypult rule and the Price exception may be qualified by the
voters' recent approval of Arkansas Constitution amendment 80,
which, inter alia, reorganized the court system in Arkansas. Section 9
of amendment 80 provides that the legislature by two-thirds vote may
amend or annul "[a]ny rules promulgated by the Supreme Court
pursuant to Sections 5, 6(B), 7(B), 7(D), or 8 of this Amendment." 93
The referenced sections acknowledge that the supreme court may by its
rules exercise general superintending control over inferior courts.94
However, section 9 does not independently authorize -the legislature to
annul or abridge the rules referenced in section 3 of amendment 80,
which provides: "The Supreme Court shall prescribe the rules of
pleading, practice and procedure for all courts; provided these rules
shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall
preserve the right of trial by jury as declared in this Constitution. '9 5
Insofar as Rule 408 is one of practice and procedure, it thus appears it
would be subject to legislative amendment or reinterpretation only in
accordance with the Sypult-Price doctrine.
Presumably, any proposed legislation designed to remedy Lake
View would declare two things: (1) that the State could engage in
settlement negotiations without waiving sovereign immunity; and (2)
that Rule 408 would apply to those negotiations. Such legislation might
well fall within the Price exception. Sovereign immunity is clearly a
concept grounded in fixed public policy, not court administration.
90. State v. Sypult, 304 Ark. 5, 7, 800 S.W.2d 402, 404 (1990).
91. 341 Ark. 311, 16 S.W.3d 248 (2000).
92. Id. at 315, 16 S.W.3d at 251.
93. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 9.
94. Id. §§ 5, 6(B), 7(B), 7(D), 8.
95. Id. § 3.
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Moreover, it is a concept the supreme court has repeatedly recognized
as subject solely to legislative modification. Likewise, Rule 408
reflects not so much a procedural requirement in the interests of court
administration as a reflection of policy designed to facilitate settle-
ments and, in the case of a government defendant, to save the public
money. Consequently, the legislature might well be constitutionally
empowered to enact a law of the sort just described.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Arkansas Constitution is perfectly straightforward regarding
the scope of state court sovereign immunity-the State is never to be
made a defendant in her own courts, and the legislature is charged with
determining and paying the State's just debts (the determination of
which it has delegated to the Claims Commission). However, as the
foregoing discussion should reflect, actual practice is considerably
more complicated. The State is deemed to consent to be sued if it itself
sues; the legislature can waive sovereign immunity and, if Lake View is
to serve as a guide, the executive branch can waive sovereign immunity
by engaging in conduct that might be interpreted as an accession to
suit. It thus appears that the State is free to ignore the constitutional
proscription against suit if it chooses to do so.
In all likelihood, this apparent disregard for the state constitution
arises from the same source as the United States Supreme Court's
parallel liberality in construing the Eleventh Amendment96-an
96. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "the judicial power of the United
States" does not extend to suits "commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. However, sovereign immunity is broader than the text of the
Eleventh Amendment suggests. As acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Alden v.
Maine, "sovereign immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the
structure of the original Constitution itself." 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999). The Court
explained: "The Eleventh Amendment confirmed, rather than established, sovereign
immunity as a constitutional principle; it follows that the scope of the States' immunity
from suit is demarcated not by the text of the Amendment alone but by fundamental
postulates implicit in the constitutional design." Id. at 728-29. In Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, the Court articulated this principle as follows:
"[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for
what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms." That
presupposition, first observed over a century ago in Hans v. Louisiana, has two
parts: first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system; and
second, that "[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable
to the suit of an individual without its consent."
517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (citations omitted). As illustrated in Seminole Tribe itself,
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appreciation that the British-American legal tradition has always
recognized the sovereign's right to submit to suit by an act of uncon-
strained grace.97 Simply put, it appears that both the sovereign's right
to avoid suit and its right to accede to suit are deemed absolute,
regardless of how the constitution might read.
This extra-textual liberality of construction is problematic in both
theoretical and practical ways. In terms of theory, given this republic's
condition as a sovereignty of the people, whose rights they themselves
have delineated by constitution, it seems somehow inappropriate to
afford the State a merely historical, extra-constitutional discretion.
Moreover, even assuming a constitution is simply a social compact
between the people and a disembodied sovereign known as "the State,"
history alone cannot justify allowing the state to renege on that
compact by ignoring constitutional directives. If it could, the State
might invoke history to avoid constitutional mandates other than those
confirming sovereign immunity-a conclusion that would render the
Constitution, if not the United States Supreme Court as its interpreter,
potentially irrelevant.
In addition, given that the constitution unambiguously charges the
legislature with determining and paying the State's just debts, it seems
inescapable that any judicial assessment of damages against the State
will constitute a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The
only way to avoid this problem would seem to be to apply the text of
the constitution literally-an option that generates its own problems in
that it would foreclose the sovereign's historical right to accede
voluntarily to suit.
Certain practical difficulties further attend the concept of waiver
as currently applied in Arkansas. Primary among these is the
precedential, constraining effect of legislative and judicial determina-
tions regarding the scope of sovereign immunity-a result that directly
conflicts with the unfettered, ad hoc discretion sovereign immunity is
historically supposed to afford the State. Lake View can be read as
illustrating this complication insofar as it suggests that the State will
always waive its immunity by exploring settlement and that it will
notwithstanding the narrow language of the Eleventh Amendment, the constitutional
prohibition of federal suits against states is interpreted as including suits by the
defendant state's own citizens.
97. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 715 (referring to Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 414
(1979)) ("The immunity of a truly independent sovereign from suit in its own courts has
been enjoyed as a matter of absolute right for centuries. Only the sovereign's own
consent could qualify the absolute character of that immunity.").
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further be bound by conditional representations made in the course of
settlement negotiations.
As discussed above, what is perhaps most troubling about the
court's decision in Lake View is the suggestion that the State can
inadvertently waive its sovereign immunity through the actions of an
executive branch employee. The disturbing nature of this premise is
only compounded by the court's casual willingness to bind the State to
conditional representations that would normally be inadmissible under
the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. Suggestions of this sort can only have
the effect of paralyzing government lawyers in their efforts to compro-
mise claims against the State.
As reflected in the foregoing discussion, the Arkansas Constitution
is absolutely clear in directing that the State shall not be sued in her
own courts. Given that clarity, it seems insufficient merely to invite the
supreme court to reconcile its conflicting pronouncements regarding
the scope of exceptions to sovereign immunity. Stated bluntly,. the
supreme court exists to interpret the constitution, not to rewrite it. This
is not to ignore the practical reality that the State is virtually obliged to
waive its immunity in certain instances, as when receiving substantial
federal funding hinges on doing so. However, the appropriate way to
accommodate that reality would appear to be by constitutional
amendment, not by ad hoc, self-contradictory pronouncements that turn
the plain meaning of the constitution on its head.
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